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Introduction
One major problem in the European Community's (EC) current internal market program is the administration of the value-added tax (VAT) for intra-EC trade when border controls within the Community are abolished by the end of 1992. The absence of border controls implies that final consumers can only be taxed in the country of purchase so that a general destination principle cannot be administered any more. It has been shown that maintaining the destination principle for trade between VAT-registered traders under these circumstances distorts Community trade when tax rates differ between countries, and it potentially leads to a process of downward tax competition between EC member states 1 .
As a Solution to this problem, it has been proposed to tax all intra-Community trade under the origin principle. For the case of the European multi-stage value-added tax, the origin principle requires the so-called 'subtraction method' for the taxation of intermediate goods, where the (net-of-tax) value of imported inputs can be deducted from the value of final sales in the destination country 2 . If the use of the origin principle is restricted to the European Community while trade with third countries remains to be based on the destination principle, this proposal implies the adoption of the 'restricted origin principle' from a European perspective.
The restricted origin principle has been analyzed by Shibata (1967, pp. 206fF.) , and later by Whalley (1979 Whalley ( ,1981 , Berglas (1981) , and Georgakopoulos (1989) . These contributions identify the conditions under which the restricted origin principle causes neither allocative distortions nor a redistribution of tax revenues between union countries. The neutrality conditions are derived from models with fixed relative prices and trade flows, however, so that the comparative statics effects of changes in tax rates cannot be analyzed in this framework. As a consequence, little is known about fiscal externalities that exist under the restricted origin principle, and about a possible process of tax competition which might take place if union countries are allowed to set their tax rates freely.
Our paper addresses these issues and attempts to link the analysis of taxes under the restricted origin principle to recent work in the field of commodity tax competition and tax harmonization 3 . Using simplifying assumptions with respect to the initial tax equilibrium 1 Cf., e.g., Sinn (1990) and Haufler (1991) , who analyzes th e tax credit method cum Clearing and the deferred payment system under the conditions of the in ternal market. 3 This proposal has been made among others by Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (Council of Economic Advisers t o the West Ge rman Ministry of Economics, 1986), para. 15 and Sinn (1990) pp. 4961 Cf. McLure (1987) , p p. 71fF. for a comparison of th e 'subtraction method' vs. the 'credit method' in the computation of value-added tax liability. 3 Our approach is closest to Keen's (1987 Keen's ( , 1989 analysis of the welfare effects of harmonizing specific and the structure of preferences, the effects of a change in the general tax rate in one of the union countries are analyzed. This allows to indicate the direction that tax competition might take under the restricted origin principle although a füll analysis of non-cooperative behavior is left for future work.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model and briefly restates the results obtained in the earlier literature on the restricted origin principle. Section 3 derives the effects of a unilateral tax reform on relative prices and national welfare in each of the trading countries. Section 4 links the results to the political and the theoretical discussion. follows the destination principle (using border tax adjustments).
In contrast to Berglas (1981) , there are no tarifFs in our model and the only obstacle to free trade is a general consumption tax levied at a uniform ad valorem rate in each country.
Due to the assumption of fixed factor supplies, such a tax creates no excess bürden in a domestic setting but it may prevent the equalization of relative prices across countries.
There is one representative consumer in each country to whom national tax revenues are redistributed lump sum. Finally, production is assumed to take place under competitive conditions.
The paper uses the basic duality concepts of the expenditure and the national product function:
taxes under a general destination principle. Abe/Okamura (1989) extend Keen's analysis to the case of three countries. Furthermore, we draw on Mintz/Tulkens' (1986) study of non-cooperative behavior in a two-country model and Dixit's (1985) survey of the literature on optimal taxation and tax reform in an open economy. 4 The latter assumption requires that factor endowments lie within the diversification cone. Cf., e.g., Dixit/Norman (1980), p. 52. 
A trade equilibrium in our model can be described by three national budget constraints and two market-clearing conditions. Market Clearing for the third commodity is implied by Walras' law. Using the symbols introduced above and denoting total tax revenues in each country by T k , the model is given by the following set of equations: We assume a Symmetrie trade structure where each country exports only one commodity ( Figure 1 ). This pattern of trade follows Whalley (1979) , and there is only a minor difference to the trade pattern used by Berglas (1979 Berglas ( ,1981 6 . Cf. Lloyd (1982) , p. 50 for a systematic enumeration of possible trade patterns in three-country models. Lloyd compaxes four different customs union models and shows th at differing conclusions a re due mostly to diverse assumptions concerning the trilateral pattern of trade. I thank Albert Schweinbergei (University of Konstanz) for this refeience. 6 Berglas assumes th at the union country B is small and does not export to country C. He emphasizes, however, (1981, p. 384) that the neutrality results derived in his (1981) analysis are independent of the direction of commodity flows.
Arbitrage Conditions and Relative Prices: In order to focus on the effects of in ternational differences in tax rates, we assume that there are no tansportation costs for direct trade between any two countries. On the other hand, it is known that trade deflection can arise under the restricted origin principle when tax rates differ between union countries 7 . We rule out the possibility of trade deflection by assuming that transaction costs for deflected trade are too high to make this form of tax saving worthwhile 8 .
Goods traded between countries A and B are taxed in the country of origin while all commodities traded with country C are taxed in the destination country. International differences in tax rates enter consumer price arbitrage under the origin principle but play no role under the destination principle. Thus, the following set of arbitrage conditions must hold in equilibrium:
'
Arbitrage conditions for commodity 3 guarantee that p3 will be equalized worldwide; commodity 3 is therefore chosen as the numeraire good and its producer price is set equal to one in each country
Equation set (2) shows that the introduction of taxes under the restricted origin principle will distort production decisions unless tax rates in countries A and B are equal. This reproduces Proposition 1 in Berglas (1981, p. 378).
Note, finally, that country C's tax rate does not affect relative prices in any country since country C operates a general destination principle for its trade. Without loss of generality, we will therefore set t c equal to zero in the further analysis 9 .
National Tax Bases: According to the trade pattern in Figure 1 , country A's tax base under the restricted origin principle consists of domestic consumption of good 3, domestic production of good 2 and domestic consumption plus the exports to country B of the export good 1. Country B's tax base is derived analogously. This yields
We know from the previous discussion that the restricted origin principle does not distort Our model is completed by substituting arbitrage conditions (2) and tax revenues (3) into equation set (1). The notation can be simplified by introducing import demands Using this assumption, perturbation of equation set (4) yields 12 "In a similar way, Keen (1989) , pp. 6ff. re stricts the initial tax equilibrium in order to derive actual Pareto improvements under a 'harmonizing' tax scheme. 12 The derivation uses the relationship Pidc* + p-tdc* + de* = 0; this is a direct outcome of expendit ure minimization under a given vector of prices. <9p^ + dpf + dp$ dpf + dpf + dp$ dmf dmf dm% dmf dmf dm% dpf + dpf + dpf dpf + dpf + dp$
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In An and A21, partial derivatives dc k /du k have been substituted by Marshallian marginal propensities to consume using 13
where y denotes nominal income.
The matrices can be given the following economic interpretation: An is a matrix of income multipliers which captures the repercussions of a change in one country's welfare (or income) through induced changes in national spending. A12 contains the partial equi librium effects of a tax change on each country's welfare. A21 is the matrix of propensities to consume and A22 is the matrix of isolated (Hicksian) substitution terms. It follows from the properties of the expenditure and the national produet funetion that, with some substitutability in demand or production between the numeraire good and other goods, A22 is negative definite 14 so that 5 = |A22| > 0.
Using the economic interpretation of the matrices A{j, it is easily seen that |A| > 0 is a stability condition of the system (5).
The ensuing analysis requires, however, a further assumption which excludes the pos sibility of income paradoxes (the so-called Metzler paradox) arising from differences in national propensities to consume. Again, the purpose of this assumption is to permit the derivation of comparative statics results by eliminating effects which are not central to our problem. Note that Assumption 2 does not eliminate the interdependence of national Utilities in the union countries, which is a basic feature of our model 15 .
Using Assumption 2 and defining the determinant of the multiplier submatrix as
|A| reduces to m = |^ii||^22|=M.?>0.
Equation (7) is used in the ensuing analysis of relative price and national welfare effects.
Relative Price Effects
Applying Cramer's rule to (5) yields for the relative price of good 1 in country A:
Recalling pf (1 + t B ) = p A ( 1 -f-t A ), the change in country B's relative price of good 1 is obtained by
The signs of dp A /dt A and dpf fdt A can be determined by setting up the following condition which excludes the possibility that cross-price effects dominate own-price effects in a:
Pi S > a > 0. 
W)' dpf
The change in the relative price of good 2 in country A is given by
To determine the signs of the relative price changes for good 2 we set up Condition 2: In equilibrium, the fall in country A's export supply just matches the net change in foreign import demand. Analogous reasoning applies to commodity 2. The discussion is summarized in Table 1 . 16 :
In the following, these effects are discussed separately for each country.
Country A: Repeating equation (6) (12) Equation (12) is just the total differential of country A's bilateral trade balance with country B. Assuming that own-price effects dominate cross-price effects, the change in the value of country A's exports of good 1 to country B is ambiguous because the export price rises but export volume falls following an increase in country A's tax rate. On the other hand, the value of country A's imports of good 2 from country B unambiguously increases following a rise in t A since price and volume effects are of the same sign. Country A's imports of good 2 increase despite the rise in the (gross-of-tax) import price because the (net-of-tax) relative price of commodity 2 falls in country A, increasing import demand.
Thus, direct substitution effects are clearly negative for a rise in t A while the sign of cross-price effects and relative price changes is ambiguous. To ensure that direct substitu tion effects outweigh all other (net) effects, we set up Condition 3:
Cf. Mintz/Tulkens (1986), pp. 148f. for a similar decomposition of national welfare effects. The 'private consumption effect' in the Mintz/Tulkens analysis corresponds to our 'terms of tr ade effect' while their 'public consumption effect' is termed a 'tax base effect' here. If Condition. 3 holds, country A's bilateral trade balance with country B is worsened following an increase in t A while its bilateral trade balance with country C improves to maintain multilaterally baianced trade 17 . This shift in country A's trade pattern erodes country A's tax base because trade between the union countries is based on the origin principle, benefitting net exporters, while trade with country C is based on the destination principle which benefits net importers 18 .
Finally, the term M in the denominator of (12) captures the property of the model that a redistribution of tax revenues between union countries induces a secondary income effect that feeds back on the trade balance 19 .
Turning to the isolated terms of trade effect, we get
Equation (13) corresponds to the theoretical derivation of a country's change in the terms of trade as the change in export prices less the change in import prices (recall from Figure 1 that mf > 0, mf > 0, m A > 0). Using the results from Table 1 , it is seen that a rise in t A increases the (gross-of-tax) price for country A's exports to country B. On the other hand, the price for country A's (net-of-tax) exports to country C falls and the (gross-of-tax) price for country A's imports of good 2 from country B rises. While the first effect tends to improve country A's terms of trade, the two latter effects work in the opposite direction and the net effect on the terms of trade is indeterminate. Thus, even if country A is large enough to affect world prices, it cannot achieve clear-cut terms of trade gains by varying its general tax rate 20 .
Note that in contrast to redistributive terms of trade effects between the union coun tries, changes in country C's terms of trade do not feed back on country A's tax base.
This asymmetry is incorporated in (13) through a multiplier term in the numerator which precedes the respective terms of trade effect. Country B: In the same way, we obtain the changes in country B's national welfare: [dp dt A c dp A 
There are only terms of trade effects for country C; as for the union countries, they are indeterminate. Note that there is no multiplier in the denominator of country C's terms of trade effect because countiy C's welfare is unaffected by changes in bilateral trade balances.
Adding up equations (12)- (18) demonstrates that all welfare effects are redistributive 21 . Of course, this is an immediate result of Assumption 1 which excludes the possibility that a marginal Variation in t A causes a deadweight loss (or reduces an existing one). The discussion is summarized in Table 2 . In view of the ambiguous change in the terms of trade and the indirect nature of the general equilibrium effect, policymakers in the union countries which pursue Strategie goals might be led to focus on the tax base effect of changes in tax rates. Under these conditions, the model suggests an incentive for country A to cut the domestic tax rate in order to increase its tax base. By the symmetry of the model with respect to union countries, the same incentive applies to country B. Thus, the model indicates the possibility of a downward competition of tax rates between the member states of the union.
Equal cuts in union countries' tax rates have no harmful effects in the model used here because the only purpose for raising taxes is to redistribute the revenue lump sum to the domestic consumer. In contrast, if the tax were used to finance a local public good, a government that maximizes the welfare of its domestic consumer would face a trade-off between supplying the efficient level of the public good and increasing the domestic tax base. It is well-known that in a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium, the outcome will be an underprovision of the public good in each country 22 .
Conclusions
The unilateral tax reform analyzed in this paper can be seen as a first step to analyze noncooperative behavior in the union countries under the restricted origin principle. While we do not explicitly model Strategie behavior (in the sense of optimizing national welfare) in country A and do not take into account country B's reaction 23 , the analysis indicates that a process of downward tax competition can occur under the restricted origin principle 22 This assumes that in the absence of tax competition, the level of public good supply is pareto-optimal. See, e.g., Zodrow/Mieszk owski (1986) in a setting where the tax base is mobile capital. 23 See, e.g., Mintz/Tulkens (1986) for the derivation of non-cooperative fiscal equilibria in a two-country setting.
when countries are allowed to set their tax rates freely. The limitations of the analysis must be repeated, however. Our analysis has made use of rather strong assumptions with respect to factor mobility, the initial tax equilibrium, and the structure of preferencesto name only the most prominent. While restrictive assumptions of this kind have become Standard in the (piecemeal) welfare analysis of multi-country models, they severely limit the application of model results to real-world situations.
Nevertheless, some cautious policy conclusions will be drawn. The case for taxing all intra-Community trade under the origin principle by way of the 'subtraction method' has been made on the grounds that this switch can serve as a Substitute for a harmonization of tax rates in the European Community. The recommendation has been explicitly based on the assumption that trade with third countries can be taxed under the origin principle as well 24 . There is, however, no indication that current GATT rules will be changed in the near future; policy recommendations for the European Community must therefore be based on a restricted rather than a worldwide origin principle. In addition to the static distortions pointed out in the earlier literature on the restricted origin principle, we have argued that a mutually harmful process of downward tax competition might occur if tax rates aTe not harmonized within the union. Thus, as long as current GATT rules must be taken as a given, there seems to be no qualitative advantage to be derived from a switch to the 'subtraction method' for taxing intra-Community trade (and there are potentially high administrative costs to it).
From a more theoretical viewpoint, the literature on the Strategie setting of commodity taxes has traditionally focused on the terms of trade effects of specific taxes (or subsidies) which serve as partial Substitutes for a nationally optimal tariff 25 . Under general con sumption taxes, terms of trade effects are less clear-cut and the focus of attention shifts to changes in the tax base. It is certainly no coincidence that proposals for the harmonization of indiTect tax rates made by the Commission of the European Communities in its White Paper (1985, para. 173ff.) have been based exclusively on the concern that member states might compete for value-added tax bases under the conditions of the internal market. This example demonstrates that the competition for internationally mobile tax bases might be come a more important source for beggar-thy-neighbor policies in the context of European economic integration than the traditionai terms of trade argument -a point that has been S4 See Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft (1986), para. 15. It is well known that the introduetion of a worldwi de origin principle is neutral with respect to relative prices and national welfare in setting with multilaterally balanced trade. 25 The classic reference is Friedlaender/Vandendorpe (1968), who derive optimal produetion and con sumption taxes when the tariff Instrume nt is not available. stressed for some time in the literature on capital taxation 26 .
